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Executive Summary 
 
 
As there is a widespread perception of legislative gridlock and subsequent failure in 
addressing national problems in Korea, this study examines what factors influence the 
legislative success and legislative time of a government-proposed bill in Korea. This study 
uses government-proposed bills from 1988 to 2016 to estimate the effect of explanatory 
variables such as divided government, the year of presidential term (one to five year), the 
presidential approval rate, the unemployment rate, filibusters, jurisdictional area of a bill, and 
the ratio of members’ bills to government-proposed bills.  
The results of regression analyses show that there is no evidence divided government 
has negatively affected legislative productivity. They also show that bills in the late years of 
presidential term have been less likely to be enacted relative to bills in the early years of term. 
In addition, bills concerned with economy have been more likely to pass through the National 
Assembly with less legislative time than other bills concerned with culture, health and 
welfare, and labor. But, the data shows that the ratio of parliamentary members’ bills to 
government-proposed bills has reduced legislative success with requiring more legislative 
time. 
These results suggest that it is not necessary to revise constitutional law in order to 
prevent the occurrence of divided government based on legislative passage of bills. In 
addition, an increase in parliamentary members’ bills reduces the success of the passage of 
bills, but a policy response to that depends on the value of such bills. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Why are some bills successfully enacted while other bills fail to be enacted? What 
factors primarily affect the time it takes bills to pass through the National Assembly? Many 
Korean analysts of the legislative agenda have widely used a concept of legislative gridlock 
as a proxy to analyze the cause of legislative success in the lawmaking process. In fact, 
legislative gridlock has been defined as a government's inability to enact policy changes that 
are essential to public needs and critical national issues (Quirk, 1994, 191), while others have 
construed it as the failure of legislators and the president to reach legislative compromises 
that alter the status quo (Binder, 2004, 35). Some studies have defined legislative gridlock as 
a low ratio of bills that passed to those that were introduced (Mayhew, 1991, 34). These 
definitions primarily focused on the legislature’s failure to enact bills during a legislative 
session. 
Yet, such definition of legislative gridlock is not sufficient enough to represent 
legislative failure in the Korean legislative procedure where the rule of continuity during a 
parliamentary member’s term is an important legislative practice. Even a bill that fails during 
each legislative session in which a bill is introduced still remains alive in the Korean 
Parliament until the legislator’s term ends. Thus, to get a better understanding of legislative 
gridlock in Korea, it is essential to consider the time a bill has been in process as it passes 
through the National Assembly as well as legislative failure simultaneously. Taking this point 
into account can lead us to understand the status of legislative stalemate in Korea, and give us 
a more precise explanation on the reasons for legislative success in Korea. 
In fact, the Korean president can have strong influence on the legislative agenda through 
government-proposed bills to the National Assembly submitted in accordance with the 
Korean Constitution. Korean presidents frequently use this influence to argue for government 
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intervention in a specific area to solve social problems. However, the average legislative time 
taken for government-proposed bills in the National Assembly has dramatically increased 
since the 16th National Assembly (2000-2004). The graph below shows that more than four 
times as much legislative time was needed for a bill to pass through the National Assembly in 
the 19th (2012-2014) National Assembly than was needed in the 13th National Assembly 
(1988-1992).  
 
Figure-1 Average legislative time of bills from introduction to final decision 
(Four-year terms, 1988-1992 to 2012-2016) 
  
 
On top of that, it takes 120 days on average for the executive branch to draft a bill at the 
beginning of the process before the legislature. The continuously increasing legislative time 
might become a main reason for the government’s belated countermeasures for the social 
problems.  
As a matter of fact, Korea has an ongoing controversy on the revision of the Constitution 
and the National Assembly law due to the prolonged legislative time. Many people tend to 
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attribute this protracted legislative time to the existence of divided government and filibuster 
system. Proponents of constitutional revision highlight the necessity for the change of the 
current five-year president’s single term in the constitutional law in order to prevent divided 
government. Therefore, in order to get better policy implications, this study focuses on the 
factors influencing legislative success and legislative time of a government-proposed bill. 
  
2. The institutional characteristics in the lawmaking process of Korea 
 
Korea has a mixed form of government with a president and a cabinet. The president 
who is at the top of the executive branch can affect the legislative agenda using government-
proposed bills. This peculiarity of Korean presidency makes Korean government very 
disparate from other presidential political systems that do not allow the president, as part of 
checks and balances between the executive and legislative body, to submit bills. Korean 
presidents have used this legislative authority to carry on the government affairs such as 
industrial policies, taxation, and other policy agenda. 
The National Assembly has had a unicameral parliamentary system since 1960. 
Parliamentary members are made up of local representatives directly elected by the people 
and proportional representatives assigned to each party according to its percentage of votes in 
the parliamentary election. Parliamentary members have four-year terms, and are eligible to 
be reelected without any institutional restriction, which is very different from the president 
who has only a five-year single term. This discrepancy between a five-year presidential term 
and a four-year legislator’s term has been discussed as one of the reasons for the appearance 
of divided government since late 1987, when presidential elections were restored.  
Additionally, the main remarkable feature of the legislative session is that every bill that 
is introduced in the National Assembly can survive until the end of a legislator’s term without 
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being expunged even if it does not pass during the same congressional session of its proposal. 
Unlike the congress of the United States that is held every day except for holidays and 
recesses for one year, the National Assembly of Korea is held at regular and extraordinary 
sessions. The regular session begins on September 1 of each year and lasts for 100 days while 
each extraordinary session can be held several times in a year if more than one quarter of the 
parliamentary members or the president requests it. Bills are introduced throughout the year 
due to the short regular session and the existence of several extraordinary sessions in a year. 
As a result, it is meaningless to measure a ratio of bills that passed to those that were 
introduced during a year in the evaluation of legislative deadlock. Instead, it is more 
meaningful to figure out how long it takes for a bill to pass the congress since its introduction 
to the National Assembly. 
Meanwhile, one of the most important factors influencing legislative deliberation in the 
National Assembly is the introduction of the filibuster system. The filibuster was introduced 
in the Korean National Assembly for the first time on May 30, 2012. The purpose of it is to 
ensure that the agenda can be discussed through compromise without physical conflicts 
among parties, and to give minority more opportunity to participate in the deliberation 
process. The filibuster can be allowed in case that there is a request by more than one-third of 
the parliamentary members. But, it is to be ended when more than three-fifths of 
parliamentary members require its termination. In fact, filibuster has not been frequently used 
since its introduction into the Korean National Assembly Act. 
 
3. Literature review 
 
Resent research on legislative productivity can be categorized roughly into two 
categories: partisan models and multi-dimensional models. Partisan models mainly highlight 
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the effect of divided party control of congress and the presidency on legislative success, 
while multi-dimensional models embrace partisan factors, as well as institutional factors such 
as bicameralism and supermajority rules, and policy factors. 
 
3.1 Partisan models  
 
Many studies on the president’s legislative agenda primarily deal with the relationship 
between divided government and legislative productivity because legislative success is 
deeply concerned with affiliation of the president with the legislature. The features of this 
affiliation between two constitutional institutions, unified or divided government, provide an 
important political context for legislation. These models attempt to determine if divided party 
control of government causes the failure of the enactment of significant public policy.   
Mayhew (1991) ignited serious debate on legislative productivity under divided 
government by insisting that periods of unified government are not associated with high 
legislative productivity and that periods of divided government do not necessarily lead to 
legislative gridlock, contradicting the conventional wisdom of politics. He argued that the 
first half of a president's term and public's supportive mood are more contributive factors for 
the passage of legislation. Skowronek (1993), Krehbiel (1996), and Quirk and Nesmith (1994) 
agreed with Mayhew (1991). Skowronek (1993) concluded that the president might be 
unsuccessful even in the period of unified government when the policy regime is collapsing. 
Krehbiel (1996) also contended the possibility of major changes in policy both under unified 
and divided government is very low because of the status quo equilibrium. Quirk and 
Nesmith (1994) argued that factors, such as the budget deficit, issue complexity, and 
uninformed mass opinion, do more to create policy deadlock than divided government does. 
But, a number of scholars contradicted Mayhew’s findings. Coleman (1999), Edwards, 
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Barrett, and Peake (1997), and Binder (1999) argued that Mayhew’s measure of the 
president’s legislative agenda has been inferred by analyzing newspaper articles and depend 
on the retrospective judgment of experts. Coleman (1999) disputed that unified government 
greatly contributes to the policy achievements when other important variables such as 
intraparty factionalism, responsiveness to public opinion, and supermajorities are controlled 
in Mayhew’s (1991) original model. Edwards, Barrett, and Peake (1997) paid attention to the 
potentially significant legislation that failed to pass and claimed that there is more legislation 
that failed during divided than unified government, particularly when the president opposes 
the legislation. Binder (1999) also argued that divided party control of government appears to 
affect the broader ability of the political system to address major public problems. 
In Korea, Jang (2001) and Kang (2001) concluded that divided party control of the 
government produces extreme conflicts between the president and congress, resulting in 
weakened political accountability and efficiency. On the contrary, Park (1992) insisted that 
there was no significant correlation between legislative productivity and party control of 
government in the 13th Korean national Assembly when divided government in the first two-
years of the parliamentary term and unified government in the second two-year period appear 
alternately. He asserted high legislative productivity can be found even in divided 
government. Oh (2004) also claimed that there is no meaningful difference in terms of 
legislative productivity between divided and unified party control of government according to 
his analysis of the legislative productivity from 13th to 17th Korean National Assembly.  
This type of research helps us to understand the importance of political context such as 
affiliation between the president and congress in the lawmaking process from a political 
viewpoint.  
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3.2 Multi-dimensional models 
 
Multi-dimensional models take into account other factors as important as political 
factors in the analysis of legislative stalemate. Most of all, we can find many institutional 
variables are applied as explanatory variables in the analyses. 
Extensive analysis of the president’s legislative agenda has been performed by Binder 
and Taylor. Binder (1999) tried to resolve the causes and solutions of legislative gridlock for 
the president’s legislative performance by classifying three dimensions, electoral/partisan, 
institutional, and policy perspective, as independent variables for explaining the stalemate of 
enactment. Binder’s electoral/partisan perspective included variables to assess divided 
government, percentage of moderates, ideological diversity, and time out of majority, while 
the institutional perspective includes bicameral distance, and the filibuster threat. The policy 
perspective variables included budgetary situation and policy mood. Binder concluded that 
divided government, percentage of moderates, bicameral distance, and the filibuster threat 
have positive effects on the gridlock. On the other hand, Taylor (2004) primarily dealt with 
the relationship between policy preference of parliamentary members and legislative time to 
pass through the congress, controlling for three variables; passing the other chamber first, 
days from the end of the regular congress, and the number of bills introduced. He suggests 
the gap between the preferences of parliamentary members and the status quo policy, 
homogeneity of preferences of legislators, and the distance between president and 
parliamentary members in policy preference can decrease the legislative time to passage. 
Jeong (2010), Choi (2001), and Mok (2007) investigated the causes and solutions to 
legislative conflict and stalemate of the Korean National Assembly. After classifying 
independent variables into two dimensions, political and partisan perspectives, Jeong 
concluded that party polarization, strong opposition of minority to ruling majority, and 
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absence of leadership autonomy are related to the conflict of the 18th Korean National 
Assembly. On the other hand, Choi (2001) and Mok (2007) primarily focused on how long it 
takes for bills to pass through the Parliament. Choi highlighted the relationship between 
environment and legislative actors. He inferred that the speed of proceedings under the 
authoritarian regime would be faster than the rate of proceedings under the democratic 
system. Mok (2007) also compared legislative time for bills from the 14th to the 17th Korean 
National Assembly. He finds that divided government, the second-term of parliamentary 
members, and years with presidential election decrease the average length of legislative time 
to passage. 
This type of model extends the scope of the explanation for legislative gridlock beyond 
partisan models because multi dimension models embrace economic and institutional factors 
as well as political variables. This study uses this type of model because this study seeks the 
comprehensive reasons for legislative success and legislative time of a government-proposed 
bill.  
 
4. Research Design 
 
The focus of this study is to investigate which factors affect the results of lawmaking 
process for a government-proposed bill, and eventually to identify the determinants that, if 
any, have a significant impact. Like multi-dimensional models, I research this issue by 
examining the effects on the results of a bill of the political, economic, and institutional 
factors that were frequently used in the previous studies. 
 
4.1 Data Collection 
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The data is derived from the Bill Information (http://likms.assembly.go.kr/bill/main.do), 
managed by the National Assembly of Korea. The purpose of the Bill Information is to 
supply legislative information to all people transparently and promptly by the Korean 
National Assembly. The Bill Information contains detailed information about each submitted 
bill, such as proposer, introduction and passage date of bills, legislative steps in the congress, 
standing committee that bills are assigned to, types of decision for each bill in the plenary 
session, and bill-related reports. Moreover, the Bill Information even has accumulated 
retrospectively the records on legislation information since 1954. This study uses the entire 
list of 6,341 individual bills of the executive-proposed bills accumulated in the Bill System 
from 1988 to 2016 because Korea has same constitutional law without any minor revision for 
those periods of time since the end of military rule in 1987. 
  
4.2 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable in this study is the legislative results of a government-proposed 
bill. I use a government-proposed bill because the failure of a government-proposed bill can 
explicitly and uniquely illustrate the legislative gridlock between the president and parliament. 
In addition, the legislative time taken for a bill to pass through parliament also represents 
legislative conflict between the president and parliament effectively. I use the entire 6,341 
bills for the analysis of legislative success and 5,281 legislative successes and 1,060 bills for 
the analysis of legislative failures. The dependent variables are whether a bill ultimately 
passed and how much time elapsed before passage of it. The time is further subdivided into 
one year or less, or a great time. 
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4.3 Independent variables 
 
This study uses seven independent variables that are considered to have an effect on the 
legislative result of a bill in the National Assembly based on previous studies of South Korea 
and other countries. These variables are classified into three dimensions depending on each 
variable’s perspective: political dimension, economic dimension, and institutional dimension. 
Table-4 (see p.16) shows the summary statistics of these variables.  
 
    A. Political dimensional variables 
 
Divided government, the year of the presidential term (one to five), and the approval rate 
of the president are political dimensional variables.  
The first variable is divided versus unified government: I classify the time period of 
divided or unified government sessions since 1987. The divided government occurs when 
different branches of government are controlled by different political parties. I summarize 
those in Table-1 below.  
 
Table-1 The period of divided or unified government 
Divided/Unified Periods Percentage of seats held by the ruling party 
Unified 1988. 2. - 1988. 5 53.70 
Divided 1988. 6. - 1990. 1. 41.80 
Unified 1990. 2. - 1992. 5. 72.70 
Divided 1992. 6. - 1992. 7. 49.80 
Unified 1992. 8. - 1996. 5. 53.20 
Unified 1996. 6. - 1998. 1. 50.50 
Divided 1998. 2. - 1998. 8. 40.50 
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Unified 1998. 9. - 2000. 2. 51.20 
Divided 2000. 3. - 2001 .2. 42.10 
Unified 2001. 3. - 2001. 9. 50.10 
Divided 2001. 10. - 2003. 1. 41.40 
Divided 2003. 2. - 2003. 9. 37.10 
Divided 2003. 10. - 2004. 5. 15.40 
Unified 2004. 6. - 2005. 5. 50.80 
Divided 2005. 6. - 2008. 5. 49.80 
Unified  2008. 6. - 2016. 5. 52.0 
Divided 2016. 6. - 2016. 12. 41.70 
 
My hypothesis with regard to this independent variable is that bills under divided 
government are less likely to be enacted than other bills under unified government.  
The second variable is the year of presidential term. Each year in the presidential term 
has different meaning for the president to carry out his or her legislative agenda because each 
year becomes a different political time for the president. To be specific, the president’s 
legislative influence on the National Assembly tends to be weakened as the remaining period 
of the presidential term gets shorter. 
My hypothesis related to this independent variable is that bills in the early years of the 
presidential term can be enacted more easily than bills in the late years of the term.  
The third variable is the approval rate of the president. I use approval rate data drawn 
from the Gallup Korea which is one of the most trustworthy survey institutions in Korea. My 
hypothesis related to this variable is that bills during a period of higher presidential approval 
rate can be enacted more easily than bills in times of low presidential approval rate. 
 
B. Economic dimension variables 
 
 
- 13 - 
The president and the National Assembly tend to experience some pressure from the 
public to make countermeasures by making new policies and legislation for the economic 
recovery during economic recessions. This study uses Korean unemployment rate data 
released from OECD and IMF from 1988 to 2016. My hypothesis about this variable is that 
bills at times with a higher unemployment rate can be enacted more easily than bills during 
times of low unemployment rate. 
 
C. Institutional variables 
 
To represent institutional characteristics of the legislative and executive branches, the 
variables are introduction of the filibuster, the jurisdictional field of a bill, and the ratio of 
members’ bills to government proposed bills as institutional variables. 
The first variable is the introduction of filibuster in the National Assembly. As 
previously noted, the filibuster was introduced in the Korean National Assembly for the first 
time on May 30, 2012. The existence of the filibuster itself can empower parliamentary 
minorities and facilitate active discussion in the legislative procedure. In this context, my 
hypothesis for this explanatory variable is that the introduction of filibuster makes it more 
difficult for a bill to be enacted.  
The second variable is the jurisdictional area of a government-proposed bill. Each bill 
can be briefly categorized into nine groups; economic division, justice and police division, 
diplomatic and defense division, education division, security and administrative division, 
health and welfare division, culture division, environment, and labor division1. Because 
                                           
1 The Korean government organization is made of 17 ministries in accordance with article 26 in 
the GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION ACT as of 2016: the whole jurisdictional scope of government 
can be classified by economic division (the Strategy and Finance Ministry, the Science, ICT, and 
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economic affairs have been top priorities regardless of the change of the president or ruling 
party since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, my hypothesis regarding this variable is that  
bills belonging to the economic field can be enacted more easily than other bills. 
The third variable is the ratio of parliamentary members’ bills to the government-
proposed bills. Because the increased number of parliamentary members’ bills may distract 
legislators’ attention from the government proposed bills, I hypothesize that the ratio of 
members’ bills to government proposed bills negatively affects the legislation of government 
proposed bills. 
4.4 Analytical Methods 
 
I summarize dependent and independent variables for this study as Table-2 (see p.16).  
As for the analytical model, there are two dependent variables, success, which is a 
dummy variable, and time, which is a continuous variable. The first could be estimated as 
probit or logit, with marginal impacts then computed, but the linear probability model also 
estimates the same marginal impacts. This is a controversial matter. Wooldridge (2006) notes 
the possibility of probability estimates out of range and of the related problem of linear 
extrapolation of explanatory variables, but then he concludes: “Even with these problems, the 
linear probability model is useful and often applied in economics. It usually works well for 
                                                                                                                                   
Future Planning Ministry, the Industry, Trade and Energy Ministry, the Land, Infrastructure and 
Transportation Ministry, the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affair ministry, the Ocean and Fisheries 
Ministry), diplomatic and defense division (Foreign Affairs Ministry, Unification Ministry, and 
National Defense Ministry), justice division (Justice Ministry), education division (Education 
Ministry), security and administrative division (Interior Ministry), health and welfares division 
(Health and Welfare Ministry, Gender Equality and Family Ministry), culture division (Culture, 
Sports and Tourism Ministry), environment (Environment Ministry), labor division (Employment and 
Labor Ministry)  
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values of the independent variables that are near the averages in the sample” (p. 255). Thus, 
this study uses the linear probability model instead of probit or logit model to analyze the 
effect of the independent variables on the legislative success of a government-proposed bill. 
For the second dependent variable, I use OLS (ordinary least squares) regression modes, too. 
The analysis model can be defined as below. 
Rit = α + β1Gt+ β2Yt + β3At + β4Ut + β5Ft + β6Jt +β7Rt +εt 
Where, Rit represents legislative result of a government-proposed bill (passage or failure 
of a bill), Gt is whether a government is divided or not when a bill is introduced, Yt is the year 
of the presidential term, At is an annual approval rate for the president, Ut is an annual 
unemployment rate, Ft is whether it is before and after of the introduction of filibuster, Jt 
represents the jurisdictional area of a bill, Rt is the ratio of members’ bills to government-
proposed bills, and εt is an error term. 
The second regression uses the same explanatory variables and a dependent variable 
defined as the time in days between introduction and passage, given that the bill passes. The 
only difference from the equation above is that the dependent variable is Ti for legislative 
time. 
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Table-2 Variables for analysis 
 
5. Findings  
 
5.1 Relationship between independent variables and legislative success 
 
Dependent variables Observations 
Legislative result of a 
bill 
 
1. Legislative failure; 2. Legislative success after one year; 
3. Legislative success within one year  
6,341 
 
Independent variables 
▶ Political dimension Observations 
Divided versus 
Unified government 
Year of presidential 
term 
Annual approval rate 
for the president 
1. Divided; 0. Unified 
 
1. The first year; 2. The second year; 3. The third year; 4. The 
fourth year; 5. The fifth year; 
The share of positive response from the public  
6,341 
 
6,341 
 
6,341 
▶ Economic dimension 
Annual 
unemployment rate  
The number of unemployed ÷ The number of all individuals 
in the labor force  
6,341 
▶ Policy and Institutional dimension 
Introduction of 
filibuster 
Jurisdictional area of a 
bill 
 
 
The ratio of members’ 
bills  to government-
proposed bills  
1.  After;   0. Before 
 
0. Economic division; 1. Justice & Police division; 2. Cultural 
division; 3. Security & Administration division; 4. Education 
division; 5. Diplomacy & Defense division; 6. Health & Welfare 
division; 7. Labor division; 8. Environmental division 
The number of members’ bills ÷ The number of government-
proposed bills  
6,341 
 
6,341 
 
 
 
6,341 
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The result of the regression summarized as Table-3 below shows that many explanatory 
variables have statistically significant effects on legislative success.  
 
Table-3 Legislative success 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 
Divided government 0.0395 0.01084 +3.64 <0.001*** 
Year of presidential term Relative to the 1st year of presidential term 
2nd year of presidential term -0.0475 0.0130 -3.67 <0.001*** 
3rd year of presidential term -0.1030 0.0143 -7.22 <0.001*** 
4th year of presidential term -0.1969 0.0180 -10.92 <0.001*** 
5th year of presidential term -0.2196 0.0221 -11.08 <0.001*** 
Presidential approval rate -0.0052 0.0005 -8.13 <0.001*** 
Unemployment rate 0.0006 0.0042 +0.14 0.888 
Introduction of filibuster  0.1661 0.0289 +5.75 <0.001*** 
Jurisdictional area of a bill Relative to the economic area 
Justice & police -0.0549 0.0148 -3.70 <0.001*** 
Culture -0.1781 0.0315 -5.66 <0.001*** 
Security & Administration -0.0471 0.0147 -3.20 0.001*** 
Education -0.0548 0.0238 -2.30 0.021*** 
Diplomacy & Defense -0.0133 -0.0182 -0.73 0.465 
Health & Welfare -0.1526 0.0218 -6.98 <0.001*** 
Labor  0.0969 0.0295 -3.28 0.001*** 
Environment 0.0247 0.0187 +1.32 0.187 
 the ratio of members’ bills to 
government proposed bills  
-0.0188 0.0018 -10.53 <0.001*** 
Constant 1.0028 0.0250 40.12 0.000 
*** P ≤ 0.01, ** P≤0.05 
First, the result shows that legislative success is statistically significantly associated with 
divided government, presidential approval rate, introduction of filibuster, and the ratio of 
members’ bills to government proposed bills at the 99 percent confidence level. Specifically, 
the data supports that legislative success has increased as much as 0.040 (4.0 percentage 
points more likely to succeed) in ‘divided government’, and 0.1661 (16.6 percentage points 
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more likely to succeed) in ‘filibuster’. Legislative success has decreased as much as 0.0052 
(0.5 percentage points less likely to succeed) in ‘presidential approval rate’ and 0.0188 (1.9 
percentage points less likely to succeed) in ‘the ratio of members’ bills to government 
proposed bills’. However, unemployment rate is not a relevant explanatory variable to affect 
legislative success of a bill because there is no statistical evidence. 
The result shows that the ratio of members’ bills to government-proposed bills has 
negatively affected legislative success, which is matched with hypothesis of this independent 
variable. However, the fact that divided government and filibuster have positively affected 
the legislative success while presidential approval rate has negatively affected it is contrary to 
hypotheses for each variable. We may attribute such results to the relatively passive 
legislation strategies of the president under divided government, filibuster or lower 
presidential approval rate.  
Second, compared with the first year in ‘year of presidential term’, the data shows that 
bills have been less likely to be enacted in the late years of presidential term. In fact, the odds 
of passage have gotten progressively worse with each year, which is consistent with 
hypothesis regarding this explanatory variable. 
Third, if we pay attention to the result of this regression with respect to the jurisdictional 
area of bills, we see that bills in ‘justice & police’, ‘culture’, ‘security & administration’, 
‘education’, ‘health & welfare’, and ‘labor’ areas have been less likely to be enacted than bills 
in the economic area. The data shows a significantly negative causation between both of 
them at the 99 or 95 percent confidence level. This finding also strongly supports hypothesis 
for this independent variable. However, ‘diplomacy & defense’ and ‘environment’ is not 
statistically significantly different from economic bills.  
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5.2 Relationship between independent variables and legislative time  
 
If we look into the results of the regression on the legislative time of bills to pass, it can 
be summarized it as Table-4 below. The result shows that legislative success is statistically 
significantly associated with divided government, unemployment rate, instruction of filibuster, 
and the ratio of members’ bills to government-proposed bills at the 99 percent confidence 
level. Specifically, the data supports that legislative time has decreased as much as 24.7 days 
in ‘divided government’, 10.5 days in ‘unemployment rate’ and 142.4 days in ‘filibuster’. 
Legislative time has increased as much as 17.4 days in ‘the ratio of members’ bills to 
government-proposed bills’. However, the data does not show any statistically significant 
relation between presidential approval rate and legislative time. 
Compared with hypotheses, the result that unemployment rate has reduced legislative 
time while the ratio of members’ bills to government-proposed bills has increased legislative 
time is consistent with hypotheses for each variable. However, the result that divided 
government and filibuster have reduced legislative time is contrary to hypotheses for each 
variable. Such result could be interpreted as almost in the same context as in the case of 
legislative success.  
Second, the result shows that bills in the fourth year of presidential term have been likely 
to have less legislative time, contrasted to bills in the first year of presidential term. However, 
the data does not show a statistically significant relationship between the other years of 
presidential term and legislative time. 
Third, regarding the jurisdictional area of bills, the data shows that bills in the ‘justice & 
police’, ‘culture’, ‘education’, ‘health & welfare’, ‘labor’, and ‘environment’ areas have been 
likely to have longer legislative time than bills in the economic area. The data shows a 
significantly positive causation between legislative time and those areas at the 99 or 95 
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percent confidence level, which strongly support hypothesis for this variable.  
However, the data does not show statistically significant difference between ‘security & 
administration’, ‘diplomacy& defense’ and legislative time relative to economics. 
 
Table-4 Legislative time of bills passed 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 
Divided government -24.7 5.3 -4.70 <0.001*** 
Year of presidential term Relative to the 1st year of presidential term 
2nd year of presidential term 9.9 8.2 +1.21 0.226 
3rd year of presidential term -11.9 7.7 -1.54 0.125 
4th year of presidential term -57.9 9.6 -6.01 <0.001*** 
5th year of presidential term 2.8 11.3 +0.25 0.806 
Presidential approval rate -0.1 0.2 -0.60 0.547 
Unemployment rate -10.5 1.5 -7.08 <0.001*** 
Instruction of filibuster  -142.4 14.6 -9.77 <0.001*** 
Jurisdictional area of a bill Relative to the economic area 
Justice & police 22.7 8.2 +2.76 0.006*** 
Culture 64.6 16.9 +3.83 <0.001*** 
Security & Administration 7.7 7.0 +1.09 0.276 
Education 87.9 16.1 +5.47 <0.001*** 
Diplomacy & Defense -0.1 8.4 -0.02 0.986 
Health & Welfare 75.5 13.4 +5.65 <0.001*** 
Labor  37.0 18.5 +2.00 0.046** 
Environment 45.4 10.4 +4.38 <0.001*** 
 the ratio of members’ bills to 
government proposed bills 
17.4 1.0 +18.04 <0.001*** 
Constant 124.2 14.7 8.46 0.000 
*** P ≤ 0.01, ** P≤0.05 
 
5.3 Policy implications  
 
To find out better policy implications from the statistical analysis above, I synthesize 
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these two analytical results. 
First, from the above results of regression, I can conclude that divided government has 
not negatively affected legislative results of government proposed bills. Rather, bills under 
divided government have been more likely to have legislative success than bills under unified 
government. Legislative time of bill passage has also decreased in the divided government. 
The data does not show any evidence that divided government has created legislative 
gridlock between the president and parliament, or the executive branch has spent more time 
on enactment under divided government. Consequently, it seems somewhat irrelevant to 
argue that the constitutional revision is necessary for the change of a current five-year 
presidential single term to prevent the occurrence of divided government. As previously 
noted, proponents for constitutional revision primarily aim to prevent divided government 
which occurs due to the discrepancy between a five-year presidential single term and a four-
year legislative term. 
Second, according to the analysis above, it seems that the remaining period of 
presidential term has had significant impact on the successful legislation of government-
proposed bills. Compared to the bill introduced in the first year of the presidential terms, bills 
have been less likely to be enacted as much as 0.0475 (5 percentage points) in ‘second year’, 
0.1030 (10 percentage points) in ‘third year’, 0.1969 (20 percentage points) in ‘fourth year’, 
and 0.2196 (22 percentage points) in ‘fifth year’ sequentially. This fact accords with our first 
assumption that bills in the early years of the presidential term can be enacted more easily 
than bills in the late years of the term. Therefore, it is very critical for the president to make 
bills into legislations that deal with president’s primary concerns as soon as possible before 
the president loses her or his power over the parliament.  
Third, if I look into the effect of the jurisdictional area on the legislative results, I find 
that bills related to economy have been most successfully enacted with less legislative time 
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than bills concerned with other policy areas. Table-5 summarizes bills by jurisdictional area. 
 
Table-5 Legislative result of bills by jurisdictional area 
Jurisdictional 
area 
legislative result 
Total 
failure success after one year success within one year 
Economy 
384 
(13.11%) 
245 
(8.36%) 
2,301 
(78.53%) 
2,920 
Justice & 
police 
135 
(17.93%) 
87 
(11.55%) 
531 
(70.52%) 
753 
Culture 
68 
(31.34%) 
29 
(13.36%) 
120 
(55.30%) 
217 
Security & 
Administration 
143 
(18.06%) 
76 
(9.60%) 
573 
(72.35) 
792 
Education 
52 
(18.84%) 
47 
(17.03%) 
177 
(64.13%) 
276 
Diplomacy & 
Defense 
59 
(14.86%) 
23 
(5.79%) 
315 
(79.35%) 
397 
Health & 
Welfare 
134 
(23.65%) 
68 
(14.95%) 
253 
(55.60%) 
455 
Labor 
48 
(23.65%) 
22 
(10.84%) 
133 
(65.52%) 
203 
Environment 
37 
(11.64%) 
50 
(15.72%) 
231 
(72.64%) 
318 
Total 
1,060 
(16.72%) 
647 
(10. 20%) 
4,634 
(73.08%) 
6,347 
 
According to Table-5 above, bills in the economy and diplomacy & defense areas have 
been more likely to be enacted within one year than other bills although the portion of 
economic bills among the entire government-proposed bills has been the biggest at over 46%. 
This fact implies that economic development has dominated other national issues as the most 
important agenda in Korean society. Relative to economic issues, the Korean government and 
the whole society have not placed high values on the other national agenda in the fields of 
culture, social welfare, and labor.  
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Lastly, the ratio of members’ bills to government-proposed bills has reduced legislative 
success while it has increased legislative time. In fact, the number of members’ bills has 
abruptly increased from the 17th National Assembly as we see Figure-2 below. If this trend 
keeps going, the president and the executive branch should make the legislation strategy more 
efficient to overcome the negative effect on the government-proposed bills.   
 
Figure-2 The number of members’ bills versus government-proposed bills 
 
 
6. Conclusion and limitations 
 
This study indicates some determinants influencing legislative success and legislative 
time of a government-proposed bill in Korea.  
Most of all, divided government has not had negatively significant effect on the 
legislation of a government-proposed bill in terms of legislative success and legislative time. 
On the contrary, divided government has increased legislative success and decreased 
legislative time of a government-proposed bill. This result implies that we do not have any 
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evidence to support the revision of Constitutional Law in order to prevent divided 
government. Also, this study shows that bills have been more likely to pass through the 
National Assembly in the early years of presidential term. Another remarkable thing to be 
seen in this study is that the Korean government has placed a much higher weight on the 
legislation engaged in the economy over other legislations. Lastly, this study shows that the 
ratio of members’ bills to government-proposed bills has reduced legislative success with 
requiring more legislative time. 
This analysis has some limitations. Most of all, this analytical model has some factor 
variables which need to be classified into smaller subcategories, but this study curtailed the 
level of subcategories to get clear answers. And, some interaction variables could be added 
for more in-depth analysis, but this study leaves those analyses to next studies. Also, because 
the jurisdictional area of ministry has frequently changed during this study period of time, 
there is some uncertainty in analyzing jurisdictional area of bills. Finally, this is an analysis 
of the bills proposed by the executive, which are important but a minority of all bills 
proposed. Future research could examine members’ bills. 
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